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1 Introduction
Entrepreneurs undertake and carry out risky projects. To do that they look for
investors willing to finance part of their projects and thereby share the projects’
risk. If investors are risk-neutral and entrepreneurs are risk-averse, then first best
efficiency requires that all entrepreneurs obtain 100 percent outside finance.
Capital market efficiency crucially depends on informational asymmetries be-
tween market participants. When entrepreneurs and investors know the value of
each project the capital market is efficient (first-best solution).
In reality, information is asymmetric and entrepreneurs know the value of their
own projects better than investors do. If entrepreneurs with good-quality projects
have no ability to signal to investors the value of their projects, then in general the
equilibrium outcome is inefficient. Akerlof (1970) shows that when informational
asymmetries are substantial the market may even fail to exist (adverse selection).
Spence (1973) shows that signaling can reduce the welfare loss associated with
asymmetric information. Leland and Pyle (1977) apply Spence’s model to the prob-
lem of entrepreneurs seeking for outside finance for projects that only they know the
value of. They consider that entrepreneurs can signal the quality of their projects
by investing more or less of their wealth in them. In this way “good” projects can
be separated from “bad” projects by their level of self-financing. However, signaling
is costly because entrepreneurs are risk-averse and those with good projects need to
retain a fraction of the risk of their projects instead of obtaining full-insurance on
financial markets. Thus, signalling reduces the inefficiencies caused by asymmetric
information but at a cost (second-best solution).
Entrepreneurs’ accurate beliefs about their project’s value are the cornerstone
of the signalling mechanism. Entrepreneurs can truthfully signal the value of a
project to investors only if they know its actual value. Yet, empirical literature
provides overwhelming evidence that entrepreneurs hold biased beliefs about the
quality of their projects. Most entrepreneurs overestimate their skills, are optimistic
about the likelihood of achieving success, and the extent of success. A small number
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of entrepreneurs underestimate their skills and are pessimistic about their future
prospects.
Cooper et al. (1988) find a large discrepancy between businesses’ survival rate
and entrepreneurs’ perceptions of success. In their survey, 68 percent of American
entrepreneurs thought that the odds of their business succeeding were better than for
others in the same sector while only 5 percent thought they were worse. Additionally,
33 percent believed that their business would be successful for sure whereas only
half of the businesses survive 5 years after foundation. Pinfold (2001) finds similar
results in a survey on new business founders in New Zealand. Arabsheibani et al.
(2000) compare expectations of future prosperity to actual outcomes using British
panel data, and find that self-employed are more optimistic than employees. For
example, 4.6 times as many self-employed people forecast an improvement of their
prosperity but experienced deterioration as forecast a deterioration but experienced
an improvement. For the employees the ratio was 2.9.1 Also suggestive of optimism
is the evidence of Hamilton (2000) and Moskovitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)
that the expected financial returns to self-employment fall well below those in paid
employment.
In this paper we study the impact of entrepreneurial overconfidence on self-
financing and capital market efficiency. To do that we generalize Rochet and Freixas’
(2008) model of competitive capital markets with adverse selection by assuming some
entrepreneurs are mistaken about the quality of their projects. Overconfident (under-
confident) entrepreneurs believe to have a good (bad) quality project, when, in fact,
they have a bad (good) quality project. Investors know the fractions of good-quality
projects, overconfident and underconfident entrepreneurs, and observe self-financing
decisions.
We start by showing that if the fraction of biased entrepreneurs is not too high,
1Gentry and Hubbard (2000), Hurst and Lusardi (2004), Puri and Robinson (2007), Friedman
(2007), and others show that overconfident individuals are more likely to become entrepreneurs.
Busenitz and Barney (1997), Lowe and Ziedonis (2006) find that entrepreneurs are more overcon-
fident than managers.
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then there exists separating equilibria where entrepreneurs who perceive to have a
bad-quality project do not self-finance their projects whereas those who perceive to
have a good-quality project partially self-finance their projects.
Next, we show that the existence of biased entrepreneurs lowers the equity price
gap, that is, the difference between the equity price of partially self-financed projects
and non self-financed projects. The existence of overconfident entrepreneurs lowers
the equity price of partially self-financed projects since investors know that a fraction
of those projects is of bad-quality. In addition, the existence of underconfident
entrepreneurs raises the equity price of non self-financed projects since investors
know that a fraction of those projects is of good-quality.
We show that entrepreneurs’ biases lower the equilibrium fraction of self-finance.
The lower equity price gap makes self-financing less attractive to entrepreneurs who
perceive to have a bad-quality project. As a consequence, entrepreneurs who perceive
to have a good-quality project need to self-finance a lower fraction of the project
to signal to investors they have a good-quality project in an incentive compatible
manner than they would have to if all entrepreneurs were rational.
We proceed by analyzing the impact of entrepreneurs’ biases on aggregate self-
finance. Entrepreneurs’ biases have three effects on aggregate self-finance. First,
overconfident entrepreneurs partially self-finance their projects whereas if they were
rational they would choose no self-finance. Second, underconfident entrepreneurs
do not self-finance their projects whereas if they were rational they would choose
partial self-finance. Third, unbiased entrepreneurs with good-quality projects need
to self-finance a lower fraction of their projects to signal to investors they have a
good-quality project than they would have to if all entrepreneurs were rational.
We show that entrepreneurial overconfidence raises aggregate self-finance if no
entrepreneur is underconfident. However, if there exist some underconfident en-
trepreneurs in the economy and the ratio of overconfident to underconfident en-
trepreneurs is not too high, then the first effect is dominated by the last two effects
and aggregate self-finance is lower with biased entrepreneurs than with rational ones.
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Finally, we analyze the impact of entrepreneurial overconfidence on capital mar-
ket efficiency. We find that entrepreneurial overconfidence lowers capital market
efficiency if no entrepreneur is underconfident. However, matters are not so straight-
forward when there exist some underconfident entrepreneurs in the economy. In this
case, if entrepreneurs’ risk aversion is sufficiently high and the ratio of overconfident
to underconfident entrepreneurs is moderate, then capital market efficiency is higher
with biased entrepreneurs than with rational ones. The intuition behind this result
is as follows.
The existence of biased entrepreneurs implies that unbiased entrepreneurs with
high-quality projects need a lower fraction of self-finance to signal their type to
investors. Hence, unbiased entrepreneurs with high-quality projects bear a lower
risk than in the rational case. If entrepreneurs’ degree of risk aversion is sufficiently
high, then the cost of self-financing is substantially lower. However, the existence of
overconfident entrepreneurs lowers the equity price offered by investors to unbiased
entrepreneurs with high-quality projects. When risk aversion is sufficiently high and
the ratio of overconfident to underconfident entrepreneurs is moderate, the favorable
impact on the cost of self-financing is greater than the unfavorable impact on the
equity price and unbiased entrepreneurs with high-quality projects are better off.
This result is consistent with the theory of the second best. According to this
theory, introducing a new distortion–entrepreneurs’ biases–in an environment where
another distortion is already present–private information about project’s value–, may
increase welfare.
This paper is part of the growing literature on the impact of behavioral biases
on markets. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006)
study market interactions between sophisticated firms and biased consumers. They
find that in competitive markets, biased consumers may be indirectly exploited by
sophisticated consumers. Sandroni and Squintani (2007) investigate the policy impli-
cations of overconfidence in insurance markets. They find that compulsory insurance
fails to make all agents better off because it is detrimental to low-risk agents.
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Our paper contributes to theoretical literature on the implications of entrepreneurial
overconfidence for corporate-investment, corporate-finance, and capital-market effi-
ciency.2 A common finding in this literature is that overconfidence causes distortions
in the economy as a whole. This result also holds in our model when (i) there are no
underconfident entrepreneurs or (ii) risk aversion is low and the ratio of overconfident
to underconfident entrepreneurs is high. In contrast, we find that entrepreneurial
overconfidence can improve capital market efficiency if risk aversion is high and the
ratio of overconfident to underconfident entrepreneurs is moderate.
2 The Model
Consider an economy consisting of a large number of entrepreneurs and investors.
Each entrepreneur has a risky project, requiring a fixed investment of 1 and yielding
random gross returns R˜ = 1 + r˜(θ). Net returns r˜(θ) follow a normal distribution of
mean θ and variance σ2. The variance σ2 is the same for all projects, whereas θ can
take two values: a low value θ1 if the project’s quality is low and a high value θ2 if
the project’s quality is high, where θ2 > θ1 > 0. The project’s net mean returns θ
are known by the entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurs are risk averse and investors are risk neutral. Entrepreneurs have
a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function u(W ) = −e−ρW , where
ρ > 0 is the entrepreneurs’ coefficient of risk-aversion and W is entrepreneurs’ final
wealth. Entrepreneurs have enough initial wealthW0 > 1 to self-finance their project.
However, self-financing a risky project is costly to entrepreneurs because they are risk
averse. Furthermore, self-finance is more costly for entrepreneurs with low quality
projects because the net mean returns from self-finance are lower than those of
entrepreneurs with high quality projects.
There are four types of entrepreneurs in the capital market: unbiased entrepreneurs
with low quality projects, overconfident entrepreneurs with low quality projects, un-
2We review this literature in Section 5.
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biased entrepreneurs with high quality projects, and underconfident entrepreneurs
with high quality projects. Let pi = Pr (θ = θ2) ∈ (0, 1) be the fraction of high qual-
ity projects, ν ∈ [0, pi] the fraction of underconfident entrepreneurs, and κ ∈ [0, 1−pi]
the fraction of overconfident entrepreneurs. Investors cannot observe a project’s net
mean returns θ nor entrepreneurs’ beliefs. Entrepreneurs and investors know ν, κ,
and the distribution of θ.
Let γ be the fraction of a project’s self-finance. Investors observe γ and conse-
quently infer the project’s quality. Investors then price each project according to
the inferred quality. Entrepreneurs seek to maximize their perceived expected utility
according to their perceptions.
In a separating equilibrium, self-finance choices are determined by entrepreneurs’
beliefs about the net mean returns of their project. Entrepreneurs who believe to
have a high quality project self-finance a fraction γ > 0 of their project. Since self-
financing has no value other than signalling, entrepreneurs who believe to have a low
quality project do not self-finance it (γ = 0).3
Among all entrepreneurs who choose a fraction of self-finance γ > 0, investors
know that a fraction β = κ
pi+κ−ν has low quality projects and a fraction 1−β = pi−νpi+κ−ν
has high quality projects. Among all entrepreneurs who do not self-finance the
project, investors know that a fraction α = ν
1−pi−κ+ν has high quality projects and a
fraction 1− α = 1−pi−κ
1−pi−κ+ν has low quality projects. Hence, investors’ posterior belief
that a project’s quality is high after having observed γ is
µ(θ2|γ) =
{
α, if γ = 0
1− β, if γ > 0 .
Competition in the capital market implies that investors break even. Therefore, the
equity price offered to each group of entrepreneurs (those who choose γ = 0 and
those who choose γ > 0) is a weighted average of low and high quality projects’ net
3We assume that there is no pooling equilibrium where all entrepreneurs obtain 100 percent
outside financing at equity price P = (1− pi)θ1 + piθ2. This is the case if 1− pi > ρσ
2
2∆θ .
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mean returns. Hence, investors’ strategy is to offer the following equity price
P (γ) = E[r˜(γ)] =
{
θ1 + α∆θ, if γ = 0
θ2 − β∆θ, if γ > 0
,
with ∆θ ≡ θ2 − θ1.
Define the equity price gap, ∆P, as the difference between the equity price of
self-financed projects and the equity price of not self-financed projects, that is,
∆P = (θ2 − β∆θ)− (θ1 + α∆θ) = (1− α− β)∆θ. (1)
We see from (1) that the equity price gap with biased entrepreneurs–when α+β >
0–is lower than the equity price gap with rational entrepreneurs–α + β = 0. This
happens because the presence of overconfident entrepreneurs lowers the equity price
of self-financed projects and the presence of underconfident entrepreneurs raises the
equity price of projects that are not self-financed.
In a separating equilibrium the price of equity for self-financed projects must be
higher than the price of equity for projects that are not self-financed. This condition
is satisfied if α + β < 1, or, using the definitions of α and β
(1− pi)ν + piκ < (1− pi)pi (2)
Condition (2) says that if the fractions of overconfident and underconfident en-
trepreneurs are sufficiently small, self-finance can serve as a signal of project’s quality.
When the fraction of biased entrepreneurs is too high, condition (2) is violated and
separating equilibria may no longer exist. We assume from now on that condition
(2) is satisfied.
In a separating equilibrium, underconfident entrepreneurs and unbiased entrepreneurs
with a low quality project do not envy overconfident entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs
with a high quality project, that is
u(W0 + θ1 + α∆θ) ≥ Eu[W0 + (1− γ)(θ2 − β∆θ) + γr˜(θ1)] (3)
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The left-hand side of (3) is the utility that underconfident entrepreneurs and unbiased
entrepreneurs with a low quality project obtain from selling the entire project to
investors. In this case entrepreneurs’ final wealth is the sum of initial wealth W0
and the equity price θ1 + α∆θ paid by investors. The right-hand side of (3) is
the utility that underconfident entrepreneurs and unbiased entrepreneurs with a low
quality project expect to obtain if they partially self-finance their project. Such
entrepreneurs expect to obtain as final wealth the sum of initial wealth W0, the
revenue obtained from selling fraction 1−γ of the project to investors at equity price
θ2 − β∆θ, and the revenue obtained from keeping fraction γ of the project with net
random returns r˜(θ1).
Furthermore, in a separating equilibrium overconfident entrepreneurs and en-
trepreneurs with a high quality project do not envy underconfident entrepreneurs
and unbiased entrepreneurs with a low quality project, that is
Eu[W0 + (1− γ)(θ2 − β∆θ) + γr˜(θ2)] ≥ u(W0 + θ1 + α∆θ) (4)
The left-hand side of (4) is the utility that overconfident entrepreneurs and en-
trepreneurs with a high quality project expect to obtain from partially self-financing
their project. Such entrepreneurs expect to get as final wealth the sum of initial
wealth W0, the revenue obtained from selling fraction 1 − γ of the project to in-
vestors at equity price θ2−β∆θ, and the revenue obtained from keeping fraction γ of
the project with net random returns r˜(θ2). The right-hand side of (4) is the utility
that overconfident entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs with a high quality project ob-
tain by selling the entire project to investors. In this case entrepreneurs’ final wealth
is the sum of initial wealth W0 and the equity price θ1 + α∆θ paid by investors.
We can rewrite the expected utilities in (3) and (4) as utilities noting that if
u(x˜) = −e−ax˜ with x˜ ∼ N(µ, σ2), then E[u(x˜)] = −e−aµ+a22 σ2 = u(aµ − a2
2
σ2) .
Hence, in a separating equilibrium
u(W0 + θ1 + α∆θ) ≥ u
[
W0 + (1− γ)(θ2 − β∆θ) + γθ1 − γ2ρσ
2
2
]
(5)
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and
u
[
W0 + (1− γ)(θ2 − β∆θ) + γθ2 − γ2ρσ
2
2
]
≥ u(W0 + θ1 + α∆θ) (6)
must be satisfied.
There exist a continuum of separating equilibria parametrized by a fraction of
self-finance γ fulfilling (5) and (6). These equilibria can be Pareto-ranked. We focus
our analysis on the least cost separating equilibrium–the one with the lowest fraction
of self-finance–because it Pareto-dominates the other separating equilibria.
3 Self-Finance
We now analyze the impact of entrepreneurs’ biases on self-finance. We start by
showing that the equilibrium fraction of self-finance with biased entrepreneurs is
lower than that with rational ones. We then provide conditions under which misper-
ceptions raise or lower aggregate self-finance.
In the least cost separating equilibrium, (5) holds with equality while (6) is slack.4
Therefore, the equilibrium fraction of self-financing by overconfident entrepreneurs
and unbiased entrepreneurs with high-quality projects, γB, is obtained by solving
W0 + θ1 + α∆θ = W0 + (1− γ)(θ2 − β∆θ) + γθ1 − γ2ρσ
2
2
(7)
with respect to γ. Solving (7) we have that γB is given by
γB =
∆θ
ρσ2
[
−(1− β) +
√
(1− β)2 + 2(1− α− β)ρσ
2
∆θ
]
,
When all entrepreneurs are rational, the least cost separating equilibrium fraction of
self-financing by entrepreneurs with high-quality projects, γR, is given by
γR =
∆θ
ρσ2
(
−1 +
√
1 + 2
ρσ2
∆θ
)
,
4Condition (6) is satisfied for all γ less than or equal to γ¯ = ∆θρσ2
[
β +
√
β2 + 2(1− α− β)ρσ2∆θ
]
.
In the least cost separating equilibrium condition (6) is slack since γB < γ¯.
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Our first result compares γB and γR.
Proposition 1: The least cost separating equilibrium fraction of self-finance with
biased entrepreneurs is lower than the least cost separating equilibrium fraction of
self-finance with rational entrepreneurs.
In the least cost separating equilibrium with rational entrepreneurs, those with
low-quality projects are indifferent between not self-financing their projects and self-
financing fraction γR of their projects. As we have seen, the presence of biased
entrepreneurs lowers the equity price of self-financed projects and raises that of non
self-financed projects. This makes self-financing less attractive to entrepreneurs who
perceive to have a low-quality project. As a consequence, entrepreneurs who perceive
to have a high-quality project need to self-finance a lower fraction of the project to
signal to investors they have a high-quality project in an incentive compatible manner
than they would have to if all entrepreneurs were rational.
We now study the impact of entrepreneurs’ biases on aggregate self-finance. Ag-
gregate self-finance with biased entrepreneurs is
SB = (pi − ν + κ)γB, (8)
that is, the sum of self-finance by proportion pi − ν of unbiased entrepreneurs with
high-quality projects and by proportion κ of overconfident entrepreneurs. Aggregate
self-finance with rational entrepreneurs is equal to
SR = piγR. (9)
The change in aggregate self-finance is obtained by subtracting (9) from (8):
SB − SR = (pi − ν + κ)γB − piγR
= κγB − νγR − (pi − ν)(γR − γB). (10)
We see from (10) that the existence of biased entrepreneurs has three effects on
aggregate self-finance. First, overconfident entrepreneurs partially self-finance their
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projects whereas if they were rational they would choose no self-finance. Second,
underconfident entrepreneurs do not self-finance their projects whereas if they were
rational they would choose partial self-finance. Third, unbiased entrepreneurs with
good-quality projects self-finance a lower fraction of their projects than they would
have to if all entrepreneurs were rational. The first effect increases aggregate self-
finance and the second and third effects lower it.
Proposition 2 shows that entrepreneurial overconfidence raises aggregate self-
financing when there are no underconfident entrepreneurs.
Proposition 2: If some entrepreneurs are overconfident and there are no undercon-
fident entrepreneurs, then aggregate self-finance is higher than when all entrepreneurs
are rational.
When there are no underconfident entrepreneurs, the increase in aggregate self-
finance from overconfident entrepreneurs is higher than the reduction due to the
lower fraction of self-financing by unbiased entrepreneurs with high-quality projects.
Can entrepreneurs’ biases lower aggregate self-financing? Proposition 3 shows
that the existence of underconfident entrepreneurs is a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition for that to happen.
Proposition 3. If some entrepreneurs are overconfident and others are underconfi-
dent, then aggregate self-financing is lower than when all entrepreneurs are rational
if and only if
κ
ν
<
∆θ
ρσ2
(
1 + 2
ρσ2
∆θ
−
√
1 + 2
ρσ2
∆θ
+
ρσ2
∆θ
pi
1− pi
)
. (11)
Condition (11) provides an upper bound for the ratio of overconfident to under-
confident entrepreneurs. If this condition is satisfied, then the increase in aggregate
self-finance due to the existence of overconfident entrepreneurs is less than the reduc-
tion in aggregate self-finance due to the existence of underconfident entrepreneurs
and due to the lower fraction of self-financing by unbiased entrepreneurs with high-
quality projects.
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4 Capital Market Efficiency
In this section we characterize the impact of entrepreneurs’ biases on capital market
efficiency. To do that we compare welfare with biased entrepreneurs to that with
rational entrepreneurs. Welfare is the weighted average of the expected utilities of
each group of entrepreneurs because investors break even.
To evaluate the expected utility of a biased entrepreneur, we take the per-
spective of an outside observer who knows the actual projects’ value. We de-
note E[u(θ1|θ1)] the expected utility of an unbiased entrepreneur with a low-quality
project, E[u(θ1|θ2)] the expected utility of an underconfident entrepreneur, E[u(θ2|θ1)]
the expected utility of an overconfident entrepreneur, and E[u(θ2|θ2)] the expected
utility of an unbiased entrepreneur with a high-quality project. The expected utilities
of entrepreneurs with low and high quality-projects when all entrepreneurs are ratio-
nal are E[u(θ1)] and E[u(θ2)], respectively. Hence, welfare with biased entrepreneurs
is
WB = (1− pi − κ)E[u(θ1|θ1)] + νE[u(θ1|θ2)] + κE[u(θ2|θ1)] + (pi − ν)E[u(θ2|θ2)].
Our first welfare result compares the expected utilities of each type of entrepreneur
in the biased model to those of entrepreneurs with low and high quality projects in
the rational model.
Proposition 4: In the least cost separating equilibria of the models with biased and
rational entrepreneurs:
(i) If α = 0, then E[u(θ1|θ1)] = E[u(θ1)];
(ii) If α T γR then E[u(θ1|θ2)] T E[u(θ2)];
(iii) If α = 0, then E[u(θ2|θ1)] = E[u(θ1)];
(iv) If α T γR − γB, then E[u(θ2|θ2)] T E[u(θ2)].
The first part of Proposition 4 tells us that unbiased entrepreneurs with low-
quality projects attain at least the same expected utility as that attained by en-
trepreneurs with low-quality projects in the rational model. This happens because
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biased beliefs raise the equity price of non self-financed projects as long as there are
some underconfident entrepreneurs in the economy.
The second part of Proposition 4 tells us that, if the fraction of underconfident
entrepreneurs is not too high, then underconfident entrepreneurs attain a lower ex-
pected utility than that attained by entrepreneurs with high-quality projects in the
rational model. Biased beliefs have two opposite effects on the expected utility of
underconfident entrepreneurs. First, underconfident entrepreneurs sell their project
at a lower price with respect to the rational case because they do not self-finance
their project. Second, since underconfident entrepreneurs do not self-finance the
project, they bear a lower risk. The unfavorable equity price effect prevails over the
favorable risk reduction effect when the number of underconfident entrepreneurs is
not too high.
The third part of Proposition 4 tells us that overconfident entrepreneurs attain
at least the same expected utility as that attained by entrepreneurs with low-quality
projects in the rational model. Biased beliefs have two opposite effects on the ex-
pected utility of overconfident entrepreneurs. First, overconfident entrepreneurs ben-
efit of a higher price of equity because they self-finance part of the project. Second,
since overconfident entrepreneurs self-finance part of the project, they bear a higher
risk. The favorable equity price effect prevails over the unfavorable risk increase
effect when there exist some underconfident entrepreneurs.
The fourth part of Proposition 4 tells us that, if the fraction of underconfi-
dent entrepreneurs is sufficiently high, then unbiased entrepreneurs with high-quality
projects attain at least the same expected utility as that attained by entrepreneurs
with high-quality projects in the rational model. Biased beliefs have two opposite
effects on the expected utility of unbiased entrepreneurs with high-quality projects.
First, they lower the equity price of self-financed projects. Second, they lower the
fraction of self-finance. Hence, unbiased entrepreneurs with high-quality projects
face a lower equity price and bear a lower risk than in the rational case. The favor-
able risk reduction effect prevails over the unfavorable equity price effect when the
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number of underconfident entrepreneurs is sufficiently high.
Our first result on the impact of entrepreneurial overconfidence on capital market
efficiency follows directly from Proposition 4: entrepreneurial overconfidence reduces
capital market efficiency when there are no underconfident entrepreneurs. This hap-
pens because: (i) the expected utility of unbiased entrepreneurs with low-quality
projects is the same as that of entrepreneurs with low-quality projects in the ra-
tional model, (ii) the expected utility of overconfident entrepreneurs is the same as
that of entrepreneurs with low-quality projects in the rational model, and (iii) the
expected utility of unbiased entrepreneurs with high-quality projects is lower than
that of entrepreneurs with high-quality projects in the rational model.
We now show that entrepreneurial overconfidence can improve capital market
efficiency.
Proposition 5. If some entrepreneurs are overconfident and others are underconfi-
dent, then welfare is higher than when all entrepreneurs are rational, if
ρ >
1
∆θ
, (12)
and
κ
ν
<
1
ρ2σ2
[(
1 +
√
1 +
2ρσ2
∆θ
)(
ρ2σ2
pi
1− pi +
ρσ2
∆θ
+ 1
)
+
ρσ2
∆θ
]
. (13)
Condition (12) provides a lower bound for coefficient of absolute risk aversion and
condition (13) provides an upper bound for the ratio of overconfident to undercon-
fident entrepreneurs. When these two conditions are satisfied, welfare with biased
entrepreneurs is higher than with rational entrepreneurs.
Proposition 5 tells us the existence of biased entrepreneurs raises capital market
efficiency when entrepreneurs’ risk aversion is sufficiently high and the ratio of over-
confident to underconfident entrepreneurs is not too high. The intuition behind this
result is as follows.
The presence of biased entrepreneurs implies that unbiased entrepreneurs with
high-quality projects need lower partial self-finance to signal their type to investors.
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Hence, unbiased entrepreneurs with high-quality projects bear a lower risk than in
the rational case. If entrepreneurs’ degree of risk aversion is sufficiently high, then
the cost of self-financing is substantially lower. However, if the ratio of overconfident
to underconfident entrepreneurs is too high, then there is a sharp fall in the price of
equity of unbiased entrepreneurs with high-quality projects which has an unfavorable
impact on expected utility. Hence, if risk aversion is high and the ratio of overcon-
fident to underconfident entrepreneurs is not too high, then the favorable impact
of misperceptions on the need for partial self-financing dominates the unfavorable
impact on the price of equity.
If the two inequalities of Proposition 5 go in the opposite direction, then en-
trepreneurs’ biases reduce welfare.
5 Discussion
In this section we discuss several extensions of the model, our contribution to the
literature, and policy implications.
5.1 Extensions
We can extend our analysis by assuming that low-quality projects yield negative net
mean returns, that is, θ1 < 0 < θ2.
If entrepreneurs are rational and low-quality projects yield negative net mean
returns, there exist separating equilibria where low-quality projects are not self-
financed and high-quality projects are partially self-financed. Investors know that
non self-financed projects have negative net mean returns and therefore they are not
willing to offer a positive equity price for those projects. Therefore, entrepreneurs
do not undertake low-quality projects.
If some entrepreneurs are biased, there exist separating equilibria where unbiased
entrepreneurs with low-quality projects and underconfident entrepreneurs do not self-
finance their projects and where unbiased entrepreneurs with high-quality projects
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and overconfident entrepreneurs partially self-finance their projects.
If the net mean returns of low-quality projects are slightly negative, that is,
−αθ2/(1 − α) < θ1 < 0, then the expected returns of non self-financed projects
are strictly positive. This implies that investors are willing to offer a positive equity
price for non self-financed projects. Thus, biased beliefs raise the equity price for non
self-financed projects and lower the equity price for partially self-financed projects
and the qualitative nature of the results remains unchanged.
In contrast, if the net mean returns of low-quality projects are substantially
negative, that is, θ1 ≤ −αθ2/(1− α), then the expected returns of non self-financed
projects are strictly negative. This implies that investors are not willing to offer a
positive equity price for non self-financed projects. Therefore, unbiased entrepreneurs
with low-quality projects and underconfident entrepreneurs do not undertake their
projects. Proposition 6 shows that when the net mean returns of low-quality projects
are substantially negative, entrepreneurs’ biases lower capital market efficiency.
Proposition 6. If the net mean returns of low-quality projects are sufficiently neg-
ative, that is, θ1 ≤ − αθ21−α , then welfare is lower with biased entrepreneurs than with
rational entrepreneurs.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The existence of under-
confident entrepreneurs implies that some high-quality projects are not undertaken
and this represents a welfare loss. Additionally, the existence of overconfident en-
trepreneurs implies that unbiased entrepreneurs with high-quality projects attain a
lower utility than entrepreneurs with high-quality projects in the rational model.
This happens because the unfavorable lower price of equity effect dominates the
favorable lower fraction of self-finance effect.
In our model entrepreneurs are endowed with a low or a high-quality project and
choose the level of self-finance. In reality, entrepreneurs effort is also an important
factor for project returns. We consider an extension of the model where a project’s
net returns depend on its quality, the effort put in by the entrepreneur, and where
quality and effort are complements. Entrepreneurs choose effort to maximize net
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project returns minus cost of effort.
The assumption that quality and effort are complements implies that entrepreneurs
who perceive to have high-quality projects put in higher effort than those who per-
ceive to have low-quality projects. This increases the return of projects taken by
overconfident entrepreneurs and reduces the return of projects taken by underconfi-
dent entrepreneurs by comparison with the model where effort is not a choice vari-
able. As a consequence, the equity price gap in the model with endogenous effort
and biased entrepreneurs is less than the equity price gap in the rational model but
greater than the equity price gap in the model with exogenous effort and biased
entrepreneurs. So, the main qualitative findings of the model with endogenous effort
will be similar to those of the model where effort is not a choice variable.
However, the quantitative deviations from the rational model will be less pro-
nounced since with an endogenous choice of effort, the equity price gap with biased
entrepreneurs is closer to the equity price gap with rational entrepreneurs than in the
model where effort is not a choice variable. One difference concerns the ex-post util-
ity of overconfident entrepreneurs. In the model with exogenous effort, overconfident
entrepreneurs are not worse off than if they were rational and all other entrepreneurs
were also rational. In contrast, in the endogenous effort model, overconfident en-
trepreneurs exert an excessive effort and might end up worse off than if they were
rational and all other entrepreneurs were also rational.
When some entrepreneurs are credit constrained, that is, they do not have enough
initial wealth to self-finance their projects (i.e. W0 < 1), the fraction of entrepreneurs
self-financing part of their projects will change but the qualitative nature of our
findings will remain the same.
It is also possible to generalize the model by assuming that high-quality projects
are riskier than low-quality ones. Indeed, projects’ net returns are usually pro-
portional to the projects’ risk. If that is the case we have r˜(θ2) ∼ N(θ2, σ22) and
r˜(θ1) ∼ N(θ1, σ21), where θ2 > θ1 > 0 and σ22 > σ21 > 0. We find that the results
change quantitatively but not qualitatively.
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5.2 Contribution to Literature
We now explain how our paper contributes to the literature on capital-market sig-
naling, corporate decisions and capital-market efficiency.
5.2.1 Capital-Market Signaling
Rochet and Freixas’ (2008) model of competitive capital markets with adverse se-
lection is based on Leland and Pyle (1977). In Rochet and Freixas (2008) project
quality, θ, can take only two values, θ1 or or θ2, whereas in Leland and Pyle (1977)
θ has a continuous distribution on a closed interval. In both models there is a
unique stage in the capital raising process, only the project’s net mean returns is
entrepreneurs’ private information, and entrepreneurs are perfectly informed about
the project’s quality.
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) generalize Leland and Pyle’s
(1977) model by introducing several stages in the capital raising process to explain
why firms underprice at the initial public offering (IPO). They assume that both the
mean and the variance of the project’s net returns are known by the entrepreneur
but unknown to investors. Investors infer the project’s net mean returns and its
variance observing both the fraction of the equity retained by the entrepreneur and
the offering price. They show that underpricing at the IPO can occur because a
project’s value is positively related to the degree of underpricing. Similarly, Welch
(1989) finds that high-quality firms underprice at the IPO in order to obtain a higher
price at a seasoned offering.
We extend Rochet and Freixas’ (2008) model of competitive capital markets with
adverse selection by relaxing the assumption that entrepreneurs are perfectly in-
formed about the quality of the project. This is motivated by empirical evidence
which shows that entrepreneurs are overconfident about their skills and optimistic
about the outcome of their projects.
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5.2.2 Corporate Decisions
We now review the literature that explores the implications of overconfidence for
corporate decisions. We focus on mergers and acquisitions, corporate investment,
corporate finance, dividend policy and innovation.
Roll (1986) shows that overconfidence can lead to value destroying mergers and
acquisitions. Overconfident managers in bidding firms overpay for target companies
because they overestimate their own ability to run them. Malmendier and Tate
(2008) provide empirical evidence that overconfident CEOs are more likely to make
lower-quality acquisitions when their firms are abundant in internal funds. Moreover,
the odds of making an acquisition are 65 percent higher if the CEO is overconfident.
Goel and Thakor (2008) show that risk averse rational CEOs underinvest in
projects relative to the optimal investment level of risk neutral shareholders. Instead,
moderately overconfident CEOs invest more in projects than rational CEOs thereby
mitigating the underinvestment problem. Similarly, Giat et al. (2010) demonstrate
that entrepreneurs’ overconfidence explains their large investments in their own en-
terprises. Overconfident entrepreneurs overestimate the expected returns of their
projects. Hence, they massively self-finance their own enterprise. Moskovitz and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) confirms this result empirically. In fact, they find that
(on average) entrepreneurs overinvest in their own enterprise instead of diversifying
risk investing in public equity (private equity puzzle). Malmendier and Tate (2005)
show that overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their projects and
therefore view external funds as extremely costly. Hence, they overinvest when they
have abundant internal funds whereas they cut investment when they need external
financing.
Heaton (2002) demonstrates that optimistic managers believe that capital mar-
kets undervalue their firms’ risky securities, and may not undertake projects yielding
positive returns if they must be externally financed. Hackbarth (2008) shows analyt-
ically that for the same reason overconfident managers choose higher debt levels and
issue new debt more often than unbiased managers. Landier and Thesmar (2009)
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show that short-term debt is more appropriate for optimistic entrepreneurs. This re-
sult is corroborated by the empirical findings of Dai and Ivanov (2010). Malmendier
et al. (2011) find that managerial traits like overconfidence and formative early-life
experiences help to explain variation in capital structure that cannot be explained
by time-invariant firm differences in traditional capital structure determinants like
tax deductibility of interest payments, bankruptcy costs, or asymmetric information
between firms and capital market. They find that overconfident CEOs who overesti-
mate their firms’ future cash flows view external financing as overpriced, especially
equity financing, use less external finance, and, conditional on accessing external cap-
ital, issue less equity than their peers. Malmendier et al. (2011) empirical findings
are consistent with our model where overconfident entrepreneurs self-finance a larger
share of their project that they would if they were rational because they believe their
project will yield high returns.
Deshmukh et al. (2010) develop a model to study the impact of CEO overconfi-
dence on dividend policy. They show analytically and empirically that the level of
dividend payout is lower in firms managed by overconfident CEOs. In Ben-David
et al. (2007) model, overconfident managers underestimate cash flow volatility and
therefore use low discount rates to value these cash flows. They find that companies
with overconfident managers are less likely to pay dividends. This result is con-
firmed by their empirical analysis and by the empirical study of Cordeiro (2009) on
the impact of managers’ overconfidence on dividend policy.
Galasso and Simcoe (2011) develop a career concern model where CEOs innovate
to demonstrate their ability. They show analytically and empirically that overcon-
fident CEOs are more likely to pursue innovation because they underestimate the
projects’ probability of failure. In line with these results, the empirical study of
Hirshleifer et al. (2010) finds that overconfident CEOs undertake riskier projects,
invest more in innovation, achieve a greater total quantity of innovation in innovative
industries, and are more effective innovators. These findings are consistent with the
implications of our results.
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5.2.3 Capital-Market Efficiency
In de Meza and Southey (1996) banks have better information about project qual-
ity than entrepreneurs and some entrepreneurs are realists but others are optimists.
They show that optimism can explain several well-know features of entrepreneurship.
For example, the fact that purely self-financed entrepreneurs face higher business
failure rates than debt-financed entrepreneurs can be explained by the fact that op-
timistic entrepreneurs prefer maximum self-finance of their projects and realistic ones
prefer debt finance. They also show that the existence of optimistic entrepreneurs
reduces credit-market efficiency.
In Manove and Padilla (1999) entrepreneurs have better information about project
quality than banks and some entrepreneurs are realists but others are optimists.
Entrepreneurs have no assets available for investment, so any investment must be
financed by banks. Banks can use interest rates and collateral requirements to screen
entrepreneurs with good projects from those with bad ones. Optimistic entrepreneurs
underestimate the probability of default and so undervalue the cost of collateral.
They find that optimists are willing to fully collateralize their loans and so collat-
eral cannot be used to separate the optimists from the realists. Collateral serves
to protect the banks against the errors of optimistic entrepreneurs, but competi-
tion between banks reduces interest rates, which further encourages optimists. As a
consequence banks lend too much, thus reducing credit-market efficiency.
The result that entrepreneurial overconfidence causes distortions in the econ-
omy as a whole also holds in our model when (i) there are no underconfident en-
trepreneurs or (ii) risk aversion is low and the ratio of overconfident to underconfident
entrepreneurs is high. In contrast, we find that entrepreneurial overconfidence can
improve capital market efficiency if risk aversion is high and the ratio of overconfident
to underconfident entrepreneurs is moderate.
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5.3 Policy Implications
Our results have the following policy implications. When entrepreneurs’ biases raise
welfare no policy intervention is needed, i.e. the optimal policy is laissez-faire. This is
the case when entrepreneurs are sufficiently risk averse and the ratio of overconfident
to underconfident entrepreneurs is moderate (Proposition 5).
A policy intervention aimed at eliminating biases is necessary whenever these
lower welfare. This is the case if there are some overconfident entrepreneurs but
no underconfident entrepreneurs in the economy (corollary of Proposition 4), if en-
trepreneurs’ risk aversion is low and the ratio of overconfident to underconfident en-
trepreneurs is high (Proposition 5), and when low-quality projects yield sufficiently
negative net mean returns (Proposition 6).
Cooper et al. (1988) and Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) argue that organizational
optimism is best alleviated by introducing an “outside” view, one capable of realizing
all the reasons the “inside” view might be wrong. Outside experts can make the
entrepreneur aware of the risks that the entrepreneur is taking by self-financing part
of the project. External evaluation of the project by financial intermediaries (e.g.
banks) may also help entrepreneurs to correctly assess the quality of their projects.
6 Conclusion
This paper generalizes Rochet and Freixas (2008) model of competitive capital mar-
kets with adverse selection by assuming some entrepreneurs are overconfident and
others underconfident. Investors know the fractions of high-quality projects in the
economy as well as the fractions of overconfident and underconfident entrepreneurs.
We find that entrepreneurial overconfidence lowers the equilibrium level of partial
self-finance and the equity price gap–the gap between the equity price of partially
self-financed and non self-financed projects. We also show that entrepreneurial over-
confidence raises capital market efficiency if entrepreneurs’ risk aversion is high and
the ratio of overconfident to underconfident entrepreneurs is moderate.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: When some entrepreneurs are biased α+ β ∈ (0, 1) and,
from (7), the optimal fraction of self-finance is defined implicitly as:
γ2B
1− γB
ρσ2
2∆θ
+
α
1− γB = 1− β, (14)
with γB ∈ (0, 1). When all entrepreneurs are rational α = β = 0 and the optimal
fraction of self-finance is defined implicitly as
γ2R
1− γR
ρσ2
2∆θ
= 1, (15)
with γR ∈ (0, 1). We consider two cases: (i) β > 0 and α ≥ 0 and (ii) β = 0 and
α > 0.
(i) If β > 0, then the RHS of (14) is less than the RHS of (15). This implies that
the LHS of (14) is less than the LHS of (15). That is,
γ2B
1− γB
ρσ2
2∆θ
+
α
1− γB <
γ2R
1− γR
ρσ2
2∆θ
. (16)
If α ≥ 0, then the second term in the LHS of (16) is non-negative. Hence, (16)
implies
γ2B
1− γB <
γ2R
1− γR . (17)
Since x
2
1−x is strictly increasing in x for x ∈ (0, 1), then (17) implies γB < γR.
(ii) If β = 0 then (16) holds as equality. If (16) holds as equality and α > 0, then
(17) is satisfied and γB < γR.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: We need to show that if α = 0 and β ∈ (0, 1), then
SB > SR. If α = ν = 0, then κ = βpi/(1 − β) and SB = (pi + κ)γB = piγB/(1 − β),
where γB =
1
ρλ
[
−(1− β) +√(1− β)2 + 2(1− β)ρλ] with λ ≡ σ2
∆θ
. We have that
SR = piγR where γR =
1
ρλ
(−1 +√1 + 2ρλ). Hence, SB > SR is equivalent to
pi
1− βγB > piγR
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or
−(1− β) +
√
(1− β)2 + 2(1− β)ρλ > −(1− β) + (1− β)
√
1 + 2ρλ
or
(1− β)2 + 2(1− β)ρλ > (1− β)2 + 2(1− β)2ρλ
or
(1− β) > (1− β)2,
which is true since β ∈ (0, 1).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: The amount of self-finance as a function of κ and ν is
given by:
SB(κ, ν) = (pi − ν + κ)γB(κ, ν). (18)
A first-order Taylor series expansion of SB(κ, ν) around (0, 0) is given by:
SB(κ, ν) ≈ SB(0, 0) + ∂SB
∂κ
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
κ+
∂SB
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
ν,
where SB(0, 0) = SR. We need to find out the two partial derivatives. From (18) we
have
∂SB
∂κ
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= γB(κ, ν)|(0,0) +
∂SB
∂γB
(
∂γB
∂α
∂α
∂κ
+
∂γB
∂β
∂β
∂κ
)∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= γR + (pi − ν + κ)
[
− 1
ρλ
(
1 + ρλ√
1 + 2ρλ
− 1
)]
1
pi
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= γR − 1
ρλ
(
1 + ρλ√
1 + 2ρλ
− 1
)
where λ = σ
2
∆θ
.
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From (18) we have
∂SB
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= −γB(κ, ν)|(0,0) +
∂SB
∂γB
(
∂γB
∂α
∂α
∂ν
+
∂γB
∂β
∂β
∂ν
)∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= −γR + (pi − ν + κ)
[
− 1√
1 + 2ρλ
]
1
1− pi
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= −γR − 1√
1 + 2ρλ
pi
1− pi .
Hence, we have
SB(κ, ν)− SR ≈
[
γR − 1
ρλ
(
1 + ρλ√
1 + 2ρλ
− 1
)]
κ−
(
γR +
1√
1 + 2ρλ
pi
1− pi
)
ν.
The term inside square brackets is positive since ρλ > 0 implies γR >
1
ρλ
(
1+ρλ√
1+2ρλ
− 1
)
.
Note: From the definition of γR we have that ρλ > 0 implies
1
ρλ
(−1 +√1 + 2ρλ) >
1
ρλ
(
1+ρλ√
1+2ρλ
− 1
)
. Thus, SB(κ, ν) < SR as long as[
γR − 1
ρλ
(
1 + ρλ√
1 + 2ρλ
− 1
)]
κ <
(
γR +
1√
1 + 2ρλ
pi
1− pi
)
ν
or
κ
ν
<
γR +
1√
1+2ρλ
pi
1−pi
γR − 1ρλ
(
1+ρλ√
1+2ρλ
− 1
) . (19)
Substituting γR =
1
ρλ
(−1 +√1 + 2ρλ) in (19), multiplying both sides of (19) by
ρλ
√
1+2ρλ
ρλ
√
1+2ρλ
, and simplifying terms we obtain
κ
ν
<
1
ρλ
(
1 + 2ρλ−
√
1 + 2ρλ+ ρλ
pi
1− pi
)
.
or, substituting λ = σ
2
∆θ
κ
ν
<
∆θ
ρσ2
(
1 + 2
ρσ2
∆θ
−
√
1 + 2
ρσ2
∆θ
+
ρσ2
∆θ
pi
1− pi
)
.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4: Unbiased entrepreneurs with low-quality projects and
underconfident entrepreneurs sell their projects at equity price θ1 + α∆θ, therefore
their utilities are given by
E[u(θ1|θ1)] = E[u(θ1|θ2)] = −e−ρ(W0+θ1+α∆θ). (20)
The expected utility of an overconfident entrepreneur is given by
E[u(θ2|θ1)] = −e
−ρ
[
W0+(1−γB)(θ2−β∆θ)+γBθ1−γ2B ρσ
2
2
]
,
which, using (7), can be simplified to
E[u(θ2|θ1)] = −e−ρ(W0+θ1+α∆θ). (21)
Finally, the expected utility of an unbiased entrepreneur with a high-quality project
is
E[u(θ2|θ2)] = −e
−ρ
[
W0+(1−γB)(θ2−β∆θ)+γBθ2−γ2B ρσ
2
2
]
,
which, using the fact that γ2B =
2∆θ
ρσ2
[(1− β)(1− γB)− α], can be simplified to
E[u(θ2|θ2)] = −e−ρ(W0+θ1+α∆θ+γB∆θ). (22)
The expected utility of an entrepreneur with a low-quality project when all en-
trepreneurs are rational is
E[u(θ1)] = −e−ρ(W0+θ1), (23)
and the expected utility of an entrepreneur with a high-quality project when all
entrepreneurs are rational is
E[u(θ2)] = −e
−ρ
[
W0+(1−γR)θ2+γRθ2−γ2R ρσ
2
2
]
,
which, using the fact that γ2R =
2∆θ
ρσ2
(1− γR), can be simplified to
E[u(θ2)] = −e−ρ(W0+θ1+γR∆θ). (24)
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(i) From (20) and (23) we have
E[u(θ1|θ1)]− E[u(θ1)] = e−ρ(W0+θ1)
(
1− e−ρα∆θ) .
Therefore, if α = 0, then E[u(θ1|θ1)] = E[u(θ1)].
(ii) From (24) and (20) it follows that
E[u(θ1|θ2)]− E[u(θ2)] = e−ρ(W0+θ1)
(
e−ργR∆θ − e−ρα∆θ) .
Therefore, if α T γR then E[u(θ1|θ2)] T E[u(θ2)].
(iii) From (23) and (21) it follows that
E[u(θ2|θ1)]− E[u(θ1)] = e−ρ(W0+θ1)
(
1− e−ρα∆θ) .
Therefore, if α = 0, then E[u(θ2|θ1)] = E[u(θ1)].
(iv) From (24) and (22) we have
E[u(θ2|θ2)]− E[u(θ2)] = e−ρ(W0+θ1)
(
e−ργR∆θ − e−ρ(γB∆θ+α∆θ)) .
Therefore, if α T γR − γB, then E[u(θ2|θ2)] T E[u(θ2)].
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Welfare with biased entrepreneurs is given by:
WB = (1− pi − κ)E[u(θ1|θ1)] + νE[u(θ1|θ2)] + κE[u(θ2|θ1)] + (pi − ν)E[u(θ2|θ2)].
Making use of (20), (21) and (22), we have
WB = −e−ρ(W0+θ1+α∆θ)
[
(1− pi + ν) + (pi − ν) e−ργB∆θ] , (25)
where
γB =
1
ρλ
[
−(1− β) +
√
(1− β)2 + 2(1− α− β)ρλ
]
, (26)
and
α =
ν
1− pi − κ+ ν , (27)
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and
β =
κ
pi + κ− ν . (28)
Taking a first-order Taylor series expansion of WB(κ, ν) around (0, 0) we obtain:
WB(κ, ν) ≈ WB(0, 0) + ∂WB
∂κ
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
κ+
∂WB
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
ν, (29)
where WB(0, 0) = WR. We need to find out the two partial derivatives. From (25)
we have
∂WB
∂κ
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
=
∂WB
∂γB
(
∂γB
∂α
∂α
∂κ
+
∂γB
∂β
∂β
∂κ
)∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
+
∂WB
∂α
∂α
∂κ
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
.
From (25) we have
∂WB
∂γB
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= ρ∆θpie−ρ(W0+θ1)e−ργR∆θ
From (27) we obtain
∂α
∂κ
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
=
ν
(1− pi − κ+ ν)2
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= 0.
From (28) we have
∂β
∂κ
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
=
pi − ν
(pi + κ− ν)2
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
=
pi
pi2
=
1
pi
.
From (26) we obtain
∂γB
∂β
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
=
1
ρλ
[
1 +
1
2
−2(1− β)− 2ρλ√
(1− β)2 + 2(1− α− β)ρλ
]∣∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
=
1
ρλ
[
1− (1− β) + ρλ√
(1− β)2 + 2(1− α− β)ρλ
]∣∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= − 1
ρλ
(
1 + ρλ√
1 + 2ρλ
− 1
)
.
Hence
∂WB
∂κ
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= −e−ρ(W0+θ1) ∆θ
λ
(
1 + ρλ√
1 + 2ρλ
− 1
)
e−ργR∆θ. (30)
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From (25) we have
∂WB
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= −e−ρ(W0+θ1) (1− e−ργR∆θ)
+
∂WB
∂γB
(
∂γB
∂α
∂α
∂ν
+
∂γB
∂β
∂β
∂ν
)∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
+
∂WB
∂α
∂α
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
.
From (27) we obtain
∂α
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
=
1− pi − κ
(1− pi − κ+ ν)2
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
=
1− pi
(1− pi)2 =
1
1− pi .
From (28) we have
∂β
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
=
κ
(pi + κ− ν)2
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= 0.
From (26) we obtain
∂γB
∂α
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
=
1
ρλ
[
1
2
−2ρλ√
(1− β)2 + 2(1− α− β)ρλ
]∣∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= − 1√
1 + 2ρλ
.
From (25) we have
∂WB
∂α
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= ρ∆θe−ρ(W0+θ1)
(
1− pi + pie−ργR∆θ)
Therefore
∂WB
∂α
∂α
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= ρ∆θe−ρ(W0+θ1)
(
1 +
pi
1− pie
−ργR∆θ
)
.
∂WB
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= −e−ρ(W0+θ1) (1− e−ργR∆θ)
−e−ρ(W0+θ1)ρ∆θe−ργR∆θ
(
1√
1 + 2ρλ
pi
1− pi
)
+e−ρ(W0+θ1)ρ∆θ
(
1 +
pi
1− pie
−ργR∆θ
)
.
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Hence
∂WB
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
(0,0)
= −e−ρ(W0+θ1)
[
1− e−ργR∆θ − ρ∆θ
−ρ∆θ
(
1− 1√
1 + 2ρλ
)
pi
1− pie
−ργR∆θ
]
(31)
Substituting (30) and (31) into (29) we obtain
WB(κ, ν)−WR ≈ −e−ρ(W0+θ1)
{
∆θ
λ
(
1 + ρλ√
1 + 2ρλ
− 1
)
e−ργR∆θκ
+
[
1− ρ∆θ − e−ργR∆θ − ρ∆θ
(
1− 1√
1 + 2ρλ
)
pi
1− pie
−ργR∆θ
]
ν
}
.
or,
WB(κ, ν)−WR ≈ −e−ρ(W0+θ1)
{
(1− ρ∆θ)ν +
{
∆θ
λ
(
1 + ρλ√
1 + 2ρλ
− 1
)
κ
−
[
1 + ρ∆θ
(
1− 1√
1 + 2ρλ
)
pi
1− pi
]
ν
}
e−ργR∆θ
}
. (32)
From (32) we obtain two sufficient conditions for WB(κ, ν) > WR:
ρ >
1
∆θ
,
and
κ
ν
<
λ
∆θ
√
1 + 2ρλ+
(√
1 + 2ρλ− 1) pi
1−piρ∆θ
1 + ρλ−√1 + 2ρλ . (33)
Rewriting the RHS of (33)
RHS =
λ
∆θ
√
1 + 2ρλ+
(√
1 + 2ρλ− 1) pi
1−piρ∆θ
1 + ρλ−√1 + 2ρλ .
Multiplying both sides by 1+ρλ+
√
1+2ρλ
1+ρλ+
√
1+2ρλ
and simplifying the denominator we have
RHS =
λ
∆θ
(
1 + ρλ+
√
1 + 2ρλ
) [
(1 + pi
1−piρ∆θ)
√
1 + 2ρλ− pi
1−piρ∆θ
]
ρ2λ2
,
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or,
RHS =
(
1 + ρλ+
√
1 + 2ρλ
) [
(1 + pi
1−piρ∆θ)
√
1 + 2ρλ− pi
1−piρ∆θ
]
ρ2∆θλ
.
Multiplying terms in the numerator we obtain
RHS =
[
(1 + ρλ) (1 +
pi
1− piρ∆θ)
√
1 + 2ρλ− pi
1− piρ∆θ (1 + ρλ)
+(1 +
pi
1− piρ∆θ)(1 + 2ρλ)−
pi
1− piρ∆θ
√
1 + 2ρλ
]
÷ (ρ2∆θλ).
Multiplying (1 + ρλ)
(
1 + pi
1−piρ∆θ
)√
1 + 2ρλ in the numerator we have
RHS =
[(
1 + ρλ+
pi
1− piρ∆θ +
pi
1− piρ
2λ∆θ
)√
1 + 2ρλ− pi
1− piρ∆θ (1 + ρλ)
+(1 +
pi
1− piρ∆θ)(1 + 2ρλ)−
pi
1− piρ∆θ
√
1 + 2ρλ
]
÷ (ρ2∆θλ) .
Cancelling out + pi
1−piρ∆θ
√
1 + 2ρλ− pi
1−piρ∆θ
√
1 + 2ρλ in the nominator we get
RHS =
[(
1 + ρλ+
pi
1− piρ
2λ∆θ
)√
1 + 2ρλ− pi
1− piρ∆θ (1 + ρλ)
+(1 +
pi
1− piρ∆θ)(1 + 2ρλ)
]
÷ (ρ2∆θλ) .
Multiplying terms in the nominator we obtain
RHS =
[(
1 + ρλ+
pi
1− piρ
2λ∆θ
)√
1 + 2ρλ− pi
1− piρ∆θ −
pi
1− piρ
2λ∆θ
+1 + 2ρλ+
pi
1− piρ∆θ + 2
pi
1− piρ
2λ∆θ
]
÷ (ρ2∆θλ) .
Simplifying terms in the nominator we have
RHS =
(
1 + ρλ+ pi
1−piρ
2λ∆θ
)√
1 + 2ρλ+ 1 + 2ρλ+ pi
1−piρ
2λ∆θ
ρ2∆θλ
.
Noting that 1 + 2ρλ+ pi
1−piρ
2λ∆θ = (1 + ρλ+ pi
1−piρ
2λ∆θ) + ρλ we obtain
RHS =
(
1 + ρλ+ pi
1−piρ
2λ∆θ
)√
1 + 2ρλ+ (1 + ρλ+ pi
1−piρ
2λ∆θ) + ρλ
ρ2∆θλ
.
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Evidencing out (1 + ρλ+ pi
1−piρ
2λ∆θ) we get
RHS =
(1 + ρλ+ pi
1−piρ
2λ∆θ)(1 +
√
1 + 2ρλ) + ρλ
ρ2∆θλ
.
Finally, replacing λ by σ
2
∆θ
we have
RHS =
1
ρ2σ2
[(
1 +
√
1 +
2ρσ2
∆θ
)(
ρ2σ2
pi
1− pi +
ρσ2
∆θ
+ 1
)
+
ρσ2
∆θ
]
Q.E.D.
Proof Proposition 6: Let the net mean returns of low-quality projects θ1 be
negative, that is θ1 < 0 < θ2. When all entrepreneurs are rational the equity price is
P (γ) = E[r˜(γ)] =
{
0, if γ = 0
θ2, if γ > 0
.
Investors do not finance low-quality projects because they yield negative net mean
returns. Therefore, entrepreneurs with low-quality projects do not undertake their
projects. When some entrepreneurs are biased the equity price is
P (γ) = E[r˜(γ)] =

0, if γ = 0 and θ1 + α∆θ ≤ 0
θ1 + α∆θ, if γ = 0 and θ1 + α∆θ > 0
θ2 − β∆θ, if γ > 0
,
with ∆θ ≡ θ2 − θ1. If θ1 ≤ − αθ21−α , then investors are not willing to offer a positive
equity price for non self-financed projects. So, unbiased entrepreneurs with low-
quality projects and underconfident entrepreneurs do not undertake their projects.
In this case, the condition for a separating equilibrium is
θ2 − β∆θ > 0. (34)
We assume from now on that (34) is satisfied. The incentive compatibility con-
dition for unbiased entrepreneurs with low-quality projects and underconfident en-
trepreneurs is
u(W0) ≥ Eu[W0 + (1− γB)(θ2 − β∆θ) + γB r˜(θ1)].
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In the least cost separating equilibrium this inequality is binding. Hence, using the
property of normal returns and the fact that utilities are strictly increasing in final
wealth we have
W0 = W0 + (1− γB)(θ2 − β∆θ) + γBθ1 − γ2B
ρσ2
2
, . (35)
Rearranging terms in (35) we obtain that γB is given by
γ2B
ρσ2
2
+ ∆θγB = θ2 − β∆θ(1− γB). (36)
Hence, when entrepreneurs are rational, α = β = 0, γR is given by
γ2R
ρσ2
2
+ ∆θγR = θ2. (37)
It follows from (36) and (37) that β = 0 implies γR = γB. The expected utilities
of an unbiased entrepreneur with a low-quality project and of an underconfident
entrepreneur are the same and given by
E[u(θ1|θ1)] = E[u(θ1|θ2)] = −e−ρW0 , (38)
The expected utility of an overconfident entrepreneur is given by
E[u(θ2|θ1)] = −e
−ρ
[
W0+(1−γB)(θ2−β∆θ)+γBθ1−γ2B ρσ
2
2
]
,
which, using (35), can be simplified to
E[u(θ2|θ1)] = −e−ρW0 . (39)
Finally, the expected utility of an unbiased entrepreneur with a high-quality project
is
E[u(θ2|θ2)] = −e
−ρ
[
W0+(1−γB)(θ2−β∆θ)+γBθ2−γ2B ρσ
2
2
]
,
which, using the fact that γ2B =
2
ρσ2
[θ2 −∆θ(1− β)γB − β∆θ], can be simplified to
E[u(θ2|θ2)] = −e−ρ(W0+∆θγB). (40)
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The expected utility of an entrepreneur with a low-quality project when all en-
trepreneurs are rational is
E[u(θ1)] = −e−ρW0 , (41)
and the expected utility of an entrepreneur with a high-quality project when all
entrepreneurs are rational is
E[u(θ2)] = −e
−ρ
[
W0+(1−γR)θ2+γRθ2−γ2R ρσ
2
2
]
,
which, using the fact that from (37) γ2R =
2
ρσ2
(θ2 −∆θγR), can be simplified to
E[u(θ2)] = −e−ρ(W0+∆θγR). (42)
Welfare with biased entrepreneurs is given by
WB = (1− pi − κ)E[u(θ1|θ1)] + νE[u(θ1|θ2)] + κE[u(θ2|θ1)] + (pi − ν)E[u(θ2|θ2)].
Making use of (38), (39) and (40), we have
WB = −e−ρW0
[
(1− pi + ν) + (pi − ν)e−ρ∆θγB]
Welfare with rational entrepreneurs is given by
WR = piE[u(θ2)] + (1− pi)E[u(θ1)]
Making use of (41) and (42) we have
WR = −e−ρW0
[
(1− pi) + pie−ρ∆θγR]
Hence,
WB −WR = e−ρW0
[
pi
(
e−ρ∆θγR − e−ρ∆θγB)+ ν (e−ρ∆θγB − 1)] (43)
The term multiplying pi in (43) is negative or zero because ∆θγR ≥ ∆θγB ⇔ γR ≥ γB
which is true. The term multiplying ν in (43) is negative because ∆θγB > 0⇔ γB > 0
which is true. Hence, WB < WR as long as ν > 0 or κ > 0.
Q.E.D.
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